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ABSTRACT 
Artificial immune systems have previously been applied to the prob- 
lem of intrusion detection. The aim of this research is to develop an 
intrusion detection system based on the function of Dendritic Cells 
(DCs). DCs are antigen presenting cells and key to the activation 
of the human immune system, behaviour which has been abstracted 
to form the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA). In algorithmic terms, 
individual DCs perform multi-sensor data fusion, asynchronously 
correlating the fused data signals with a secondary data stream. Ag- 
gregate output of a population of cells is analysed and forms the 
basis of an anomaly detection system. In this paper the DCA is ap- 
plied to the detection of outgoing port scans using TCP SYN pack- 
ets.  Results show that detection can be achieved with the DCA, 
yet some false positives can be encountered when simultaneously 
scanning and using other network services. Suggestions are made 
for using adaptive signals to alleviate this uncovered problem. 
Categories  and Subject Descriptors: I.2 Computing Methodolo- 
gies: Artificial Intelligence 
General  Terms:  Algorithms, Security. 
Keywords:  Artificial immune systems, Dendritic Cells, port scans, 
anomaly detection. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) is a recent addition to ar- 
tificial immune systems (AIS), a collection of algorithms inspired 
by the human immune system. The DCA is based on current think- 
ing in immunology, regarding the role of ‘danger signals’[10] as 
activators of the immune system. It is shown experimentally that in 
the human immune system, Dendritic Cells (DCs) process danger 
signals and other indicators of damage and instruct the adaptive im- 
mune system to respond appropriately. In this paper we present an 
approach to intrusion detection inspired by the observed behaviour 
of natural dendritic cells. 
In nature, DCs are sensitive to changes in concentration of dif- 
ferent signals derived from their tissue environment.  DCs com- 
bine these signals internally to produce their own output signals in 
combination with location markers in the form of antigen[11]. The 
signal combination procedure is facilitated through a mechanism 
known as signal transduction. The signals received from the tissue 
during antigen collection determines the context in which the an- 
tigen is presented to the adaptive arm of the immune system. The 
outcome is either tolerance or activation towards entities express- 
ing antigen of the same structure as the presented antigen.  DCs 
form ideal inspiration for an artificial immune system based intru- 
sion detection algorithm as they are a key cell in this biological 
decision. 
The DCA is not the first AIS algorithm applied to intrusion de- 
tection.  In fact, intrusion detection systems (IDS) were amongst 
the first applications of any AIS, based on the premise of combat- 
ing computer viruses with a computer immune system.  Negative 
selection [7] has been used with some success, but is plagued by 
problems surrounding scaling and false positives[14]. The premise 
of the Danger Project [1] is to alleviate the problems encountered 
with negative selection through the incorporation of danger the- 
ory based immunology to AIS. The DCA is one of the significant 
research outcomes of the Danger Project, alongside the libtissue 
framework[16] and developments in DC biology[17]. 
The aim of this paper is to expand on previous work using the 
Dendritic cell algorithm [5], by applying the algorithm to realistic 
port scan detection and observing the effects on the system. This 
can be used to gain insight into the behaviour of the DCA under 
different conditions and the development of a generalised signal 
selection schema. 
This paper describes the application of the DCA to the detec- 
tion of port scans based on the sending of SYN packets. This type 
of scan is termed a SYN scan. Section 2 contains background in- 
formation regarding the use of AIS in computer security, an over- 
view of the immunology used as inspiration, and an overview of 
the DCA itself.  General rules for signal selection are outlined in 
Section 3, with examples of signals used for the purpose of scan 
detection. Experiments demonstrating the use of the DCA for SYN 
scan detection are outlined in Section 4. Results show the effects 
of different scanning scenarios on the detection capabilities of the 
algorithm. The final sections include a discussion of these results 
and their implications for the future of this algorithm. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
In this section we present information regarding the use of AIS 
within Intrusion detection, a summary of Dendritic cell biology and 
the fundamentals of the Dendritic Cell Algorithm. 
 
2.1 Computer Security and AIS 
Intrusion detection in computer security is the detection of unau- 
thorised use and abuse of computer systems and networks. The ma- 
jority of techniques in IDS rely on signature-based misuse systems, 
where patterns of known malicious behaviour are stored in a data- 
base and are compared against observed patterns at run-time[13]. 
This approach can lead to false negative errors as the signature base 
must be constantly updated in order to provide adequate protection. 
Another approach tried by the IDS community is anomaly detec- 
tion.  In this paradigm, a profile of good or normal behaviour is 
created from training data.  Deviations from normal result in the 
generation of alerts.  Anomaly detection systems can be prone to 
false positive errors, detecting normal actions as anomalous, be- 
cause normal is difficult to define and can change over time. Early 
AIS were developed for the purpose of detecting intruders in the 
context of computer security[3]. The method employed to achieve 
protection against breaches in computer security was the negative 
selection (NS) algorithm [7]. 
Extensive amounts of work have been performed with this al- 
gorithm, spanning over a decade of research within AIS[2].   In 
particular, the NS algorithm has been applied to the detection of 
anomalous connections between computers[7]. This anomaly de- 
tection style system used a supervised learning paradigm. Network 
connections are represented as bit-strings, and a profile of normal 
strings is created as training data. These positive examples of nor- 
mal are shown to a set of detectors, who are assigned randomly 
generated strings.  Each detector is matched against each training 
item for similarity assessment. Should a detector match a sufficient 
number of normal strings, it is deleted from the detector set. This 
filtering results in a set of detectors tuned to detect strings which 
fall outside this normal set.  This functions in a similar manner 
to mechanisms shown in classical immunology based on the self- 
nonself paradigm. 
The NS approach has a number of problems, highlighted by vari- 
ous researchers within AIS and proved both empirically and the- 
oretically.  Firstly the algorithm does not scale as well as expec- 
ted[8].  This is due to the randomisation process associated with 
the generation of the detector set. As the size of the detector space 
increases, the number of detectors needed to cover the space in- 
creases exponentially.  Additionally, a higher rate of false posit- 
ives was shown than expected [14], despite attempts to improve 
the representation and the addition of features such as user interac- 
tion based ‘co-stimulation’ techniques. The false positive problem 
arises due to the initial static definition of normal. What is ‘normal’ 
changes over time, as new previously unseen connections are made 
and once trusted connections can become subverted for malicious 
purposes. 
In 2003, Aickelin et al [1] outlined the Danger Project, describ- 
ing the application of the ‘danger theory’ to intrusion detection sys- 
tems. The authors suggested a system of detection based around the 
presence or absence of danger signals as opposed to the pattern- 
matching based approach used in negative selection. Danger sig- 
nals released as a result of dying cells indicate damage, and stim- 
ulate the immune system.  It was proposed that a system which 
could differentiate between data collected in a dangerous context 
with data collected in a safe context.  It was suggested that some 
of the problems with false positives could be alleviated through 
the incorporation of these two contexts for the purpose of IDS. As 
dendritic cells are a key cell in the translation of danger signals, 
they have formed a central part in the development of the danger 
based IDS, described in this paper. 
 
2.2 Dendritic  Cells 
In this section a brief overview of the biological principles used 
in the Dendritic Cell Algorithm are introduced. For more detailed 
discussion of DC biology, please refer to [9] or [4]. 
In the human body, DCs have a dual role, as garbage collectors 
for tissue debris and as commanders of the adaptive immune sys- 
tem.  DCs belong to the innate immune system, and do not have 
the adaptive capability of the lymphocytes of the adaptive immune 
system.  DCs exist in various states of differentiation, which de- 
termines their exact function.  Modulations between the different 
states are dependent upon the receipt of signals while in the initial 
or immature state. The signals in question are derived from numer- 
ous sources, including pathogens, from healthy dying cells, from 
damaged cells and from inflammation. Each DC has the capability 
to combine the relative proportions of input signals to produce its 
own set of output signals.  Input signals are categorised based on 
their origin: 
 
PAMPs:  Pathogenic associated molecular patterns are proteins ex- 
pressed exclusively by bacteria, which can be detected by 
DCs and result in immune activation. The presence of PAMPS 
usually indicates an anomalous situation. 
 
Danger signals:  Signals produced as a result of unplanned nec- 
rotic cell death. On damage to a cell, the chaotic breakdown 
of internal components form danger signals which accumu- 
late in tissue. DCs are sensitive to changes in danger signal 
concentration. The presence of danger signals may or may 
not indicate an anomalous situation, however the probablility 
of an anomaly is higher than under normal circumstances. 
 
Safe signals:  Signals produced via the process of normal cell death, 
namely apoptosis. Cells must apoptose for regulatory reas- 
ons, and the tightly controlled process results in the release 
of various signals into the tissue. These ‘safe signals’ result 
in immune suppression. The presence of safe signals almost 
certainly indicate that no anomalies are present. 
 
Inflammation: Various immune-stimulating molecules can be re- 
leased as a result of injury. Inflammatory signals and the pro- 
cess of inflammation is not enough to stimulate DCs alone, 
but can amplify the effects of the other three categories of 
signal. It is not possible to say whether an anomaly is more 
or less likely if inflammatory signals are present. However, 
their presence amplifies the above three signals. 
 
Dendritic cells act as natural data fusion agents, producing vari- 
ous output signals in response to the receipt of differing combin- 
ations of input signal. The relative concentration of output signal 
is used to determine the exact state of differentiation, expressed 
by the production of two molecules, namely IL-12 and IL-10.  In 
their immature state, dendritic cells collect antigen within the tis- 
sue compartment.  During this phase they are exposed to varying 
concentrations of the input signals.  Exposure to PAMPs, danger 
signals and safe signals causes the increased production of costim- 
ulatory molecules, and a resulting removal from the tissue and mi- 
gration to a local lymph node. 
DCs translate the signal information received in the tissue into 
a context for antigen presentation, i.e. is the antigen presented in 
an overal ‘normal’ or ‘anomalous’ context. The antigen collected 
while in the immature phase is expressed on the surface of the DC. 
Whilst in the lymph node, DCs seek out T-lymphocytes (T-cell) and 
attempt to bind expressed antigen with the T-cells variable region 
receptor. T-cells with a high enough affinity for the presented an- 
tigen are influenced by the output signals of the DC. DCs exposed 
to predominantly PAMPs and danger signals are termed ‘mature 
DCs’; they produce mature DC output signals, IL-12, which activ- 
ate the bound T-cells. This links the activation of T-cells to the po- 
tential suspect antigen present in tissue when intruders and damage 
are evident.  Once activation has been achieved the T-cell travels 
  
 
 
 
back to the tissue to seek out any entity displaying a matching an- 
tigen. Conversely, if the DC is exposed to predominantly safe sig- 
nals, antigens are presented in a safe context, as little damage is 
evident when the antigen is collected.  This induced state of dif- 
ferentiation is termed semi-mature. In this state the DC produces 
IL-10 which has the ability to de-activate T-cells. .  If the match- 
ing T-cell encounters an entity expressing this antigen, no response 
is mounted. The balance between the signals is translated via the 
signal processing and correlation ability of these cells. The over- 
all immune system response is based on the systemic maturation 
state average of the whole DC population. An abstract view of this 
The algorithm uses the notion of tissue, which supports the initial 
processing of data, as implicated in Twycross and Aickelin [16]. 
Two ‘compartments’ are necessary, one for data collection and pro- 
cessing termed tissue, and one for the analysis of antigen termed a 
‘Lymph node’. A diagram of the DCA is presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure  1:  An abstract view of DC maturation and signals re- 
quired for differentiation.  CKs denote cytokines, molecular 
messengers between immune system cells. 
 
 
2.3 The Dendritic  Cell Algorithm 
The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) was first introduced by 
Greensmith et al [4] in 2005. It has since been applied to two-class 
classification of a static machine learning dataset[4], the detection 
of small-scale port scans, under both off-line conditions[5] and in 
real-time experiments [6]. It represents a shift in focus within the 
field of AIS, from algorithms based solely on the adaptive immune 
system function to those incorporating metaphors derived from the 
innate immune system.  This has paralleled similar trends in im- 
munology, where for decades it was believed that the immune sys- 
tem used a pattern based system to identify pathogens. Opposition 
to this theory in the light of volumes of opposing evidence stim- 
ulated research of the innate driven mechanism demonstrated via 
DC behaviour and how this integrates with the concepts of clas- 
sical immunology. In a similar manner, the DCA abandons the use 
of pattern matching to classify antigen, as previously used in the 
Negative Selection algorithm [7]. As a result it does not suffer the 
scaling problems outlined for negative selection. A brief descrip- 
tion of the algorithm follows below, with a detailed description and 
its implementation given in Greensmith et al [5]. 
The DCA is a population based system, with each agent in the 
system represented as a cell. Each cell has the capacity to collect 
data items, termed antigen, and the processing of values of input 
signal. The combination of the input signals forms cumulative out- 
put signals of the DCs.  The population of cells is used to correl- 
ate co-occurring and disparate data sources, effectively combining 
the ‘suspect’ data (antigen) with ‘evidence’ in the form of signals. 
Figure 2: Illustration of the DCA showing data input, continu- 
ous sampling, the maturation process and antigen analysis. 
 
In the tissue compartment, input data is stored for collection by 
the DC population. Antigens are stored in an antigen vector, with 
signals stored in a signal matrix. The population of DCs is stored 
as an array of objects. Multiple signals of different categories can 
be used as input and stored in the matrix. The signal matrix facil- 
itates the representation of signals within the system, providing the 
interface between raw values of input data and signal values for the 
use of the DC population. Signals and antigen are streamed to the 
tissue, with both storage data structures updated upon the arrival 
of new data.  Cells in the sampling population are updated once 
per second. During this update, each cell selects 10 indices within 
the antigen vector, and transfers any antigen contained within the 
vector to the cell’s own antigen store. Once the antigen vector has 
been sampled, values from the signal matrix are copied to the cells 
internal signal store. Cumulative output signal values are updated 
each time the signal matrix is visited. A schematic representation 
of the signal processing equation is shown in Figure 3. 
The output signal value representing the costimulatory molecules 
(CSMs) is used as a marker of maturation, enforcing a limit on the 
time a cell spends sampling before migrating to the lymph node. 
The value for CSM is incremented in proportion to the quantity 
of input signals received. The input signals are combined to form 
CSMs using a simple weighted sum. Weights for this equation are 
shown in previous work [5]. They have been derived from immun- 
ological observations [17] and were refined based on a sensitivity 
analysis performed in previous work [6]. Once the value of CSM 
is greater than the cells migration threshold, the cell is removed 
from the sampling population and is transferred to the Lymph node 
compartment. 
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The SYN scan itself is used to determine which ports are open 
and which services are running on specified hosts. Unlike the de- 
fault TCP Connect scan, the SYN scan leaves no trace in normal 
system logs, as the TCP ‘3-way handshake’ is left incomplete. SYN 
scans involve sending TCP packets to IP addresses specified at the 
command line of the scan program. The scanning machine sends 
a SYN packet to each address, and uses the information retrieved 
from the scanned remote machines to characterise the network. If 
a SYN packet is sent to a closed port, the remote machine responds 
by sending a TCP reset (RST) packet back to the scanning machine. 
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Conversely, if the port is open, the remote machine responds with 
a TCP SYN-ACK packet. The scanning machine then terminates 
the potential TCP connection by sending a RST packet to the re- 
mote machine. As the 3 way handshake is not completed, no actual 
connection is made to the remote machine. 
Negative Weight Thickness of line ~ Transforming Weight 3.1 Signals 
In vivo, DCs combine input signals in the form of concentra- 
Figure  3: A schematic  diagram  of the signal processing  equa- 
tion used by every DC to fuse input  signals and derive output 
signals. 
 
 
Assessment of the output signals of DCs (either IL-10 or IL- 
12) in the lymph node is used to form the context of the collected 
antigen. The two remaining output cytokines are assessed. A high 
value of collected PAMPs and danger signals with a low value of 
safe signal is likely to result in an increase in mature output signal. 
Conversely a high value of safe signal will result in a high value of 
semi mature output signal. The values for semi mature and mature 
output signals are compared.  The context of the DC is given by 
the output signal with the greatest value, with the assignment of 
context of 0 for semi-mature and 1 for mature. In the event of a tie, 
the cell is given a context of 0. 
Antigens collected by the DC are printed to a log file, in combin- 
ation with the context of the cell. An average context can be calcu- 
lated for antigens of identical value or structure (type of antigen). 
The total fraction of mature antigen, per type of antigen, is derived 
forming the mature context antigen value or MCAV coefficient.  The 
nearer a MCAV is to 1, the more likely the antigen is anomalous, as 
it was frequently collected in a context with high values of danger 
signals and PAMPs repeatedly. A confidence metric for the MCAV 
is derived using the total number of antigen presented per type of 
antigen. The higher the confidence value, the greater the probabil- 
ity of the MCAV being an accurate representation of the processed 
data.  The uses of the antigen confidence indicator are shown in 
Section 5. 
 
3. SYN PORT SCAN DETECTION 
Previous use of the DCA involved the detection of a short and 
simple ping scan, based on the ICMP ‘ping’ protocol. To challenge 
the capability of the DCA, in this paper the algorithm is applied 
to the detection of the more complicated port scan, the TCP SYN 
scan. This is a commonly used type of scan, which leaves no trace 
in the normal system logs. Port scans form an ideal model of an in- 
trusion, and techniques applied to scan detection can also be used 
to detect scanning worms. Early detection of scanning can prevent 
more serious attacks, as it is a tool crucial to the information dis- 
covery stage of intrusions. In this paper, we aim to detect a SYN 
scan launched from a victim machine, where the DCA is used to 
monitor the behaviour of the victim. This forms a scenario repres- 
enting a scan performed by an insider, namely a legitimate user of 
the system who uses the system in an unauthorised manner. 
tion of molecules, translated through a network of receptors, signal 
transduction mechanisms and gene regulatory processes.  Natural 
DCs are sensitive to changes in their environment, described as 
the chemical content of tissue which the DCs can sense through 
their expressed receptors.  In a similar manner, the DCs used in 
the DCA are sensitive to changes of value within the signal matrix. 
This system relies on correct mapping of signals through examining 
the nature of the input data, and the assignment of correct weight- 
ings.  To assist the signal selection process, a set of general rules 
for correct mapping are defined. Previous experiments have shown 
that modifications to the mappings of the different signals can lead 
to the generation of false positive errors [5], though robustness is 
shown if PAMPs and danger signals are incorrectly mapped. Input 
signals are abstracted from the general biological principles out- 
lined in the previous section: 
 
• PAMPs: A signature of abnormal behaviour, e.g. errors per 
second. An increase in this signal is associated with a high 
confidence of abnormality. 
 
• Danger Signal:  A measure of an attribute which increases 
in value to indicate an abnormality e.g. number of network 
packets per second.  Low values of this signal may not be 
anomalous, giving a high value a moderate confidence of in- 
dicating abnormality. 
 
• Safe Signal: A measure which increases value in conjunction 
with observed normal behaviour e.g.  a low rate of change 
of packet sending.  This is a confident indicator of normal, 
predictable or steady-state system behaviour. This signal is 
used to counteract the effects of PAMPs and danger signals. 
 
• Inflammation: A general signal of system distress, which is 
insufficient to cause any maturation in the absence of other 
signals e.g. many users logged into a system remotely. Used 
to amplify the effects of the other signals. 
 
For the detection of SYN scans, seven signals are derived from 
behavioural attributes of the monitored machine: two PAMPs, two 
danger signals, two safe signals and one inflammatory signal. Hav- 
ing two signals in each category should make the DCA more ro- 
bust against random network fluctuations.  As the inflammatory 
signals is observed locally, one signal should be sufficient.  The 
PAMP signals are both taken from data sources which indicate a 
scan specifically. Danger signals are derived from attributes which 
represent changes in behaviour. Safe signals are also derived from 
changes in behaviour, but high safe signal values are shown when 
the changes are small in magnitude.  The inflammatory signal is 
simplified as a binary signal i.e. inflammation present or not. All 
PAMPs, dangers and safe signals are normalised within a range of 
0 and 100 to facilitate further processing. 
PAMP-1 is the number of ICMP ‘destination unreachable’ er- 
ror messages received per second.  Scanning IP addresses which 
are not attached to a running machine or machines which are fire- 
walled against ICMP packets generate these error messages. This 
signal was proved useful in detecting ping scans, and may also be 
useful in the detection of SYN scans, as an initial ping scan is 
performed to find running hosts.  In this experiment, the number 
of ICMP messages generated was significantly less than observed 
with a ping scan. To account for this, normalisation of this signal 
includes multiplying the raw signal value by 5, capped at a value of 
100. 
PAMP-2 is the number of TCP reset packets sent and received 
per second. Due to the nature of the scan, a volume of RST packets 
are created in both port status cases; they are generated from the 
scanning machine if ports are open, and are generated by the remote 
machines if ports are closed. RST packets are not usually present 
in any considerable volume, so their increased frequency is a likely 
sign of scanning activity. This signal is normalised linearly, with a 
maximum cap set at 100 RSTs per second. 
The first danger signal (DS-1) is derived from the number of 
network packets sent per second.  Previous experiments with this 
signal [5] indicate it is useful for the detection of outbound scans. 
A different approach is taken for the normalisation of this signal. A 
sigmoid function is used to emphasise the differences in observed 
rate, making the range of 100 to 700 packets per second more sens- 
itive. This function makes the system less sensitive to fluctuations 
under 100 packets per second, whilst keeping the sensitivity of the 
higher values. A cap is set at 1000 packets per second. The result- 
ing signal range is between 0 and 100. 
DS-2 is derived from the ratio of TCP packets to all other packets 
processed by the network card of the scanning machine. This signal 
is used as during SYN scans there is a burst of traffic comprised of 
almost entirely TCP type packets. The ratio is noramlised through 
multiplication by 100, to give this signal the same range as DS-1. 
Safe signals are implemented to counteract the effects of the 
other signals, hopefully reducing the number of false positive an- 
tigens.  The first safe signal (SS-1) is applied as described in [5] 
and encapsulates the rate of change of sending of network packets. 
High values of this signal are achieved if the rate of change is small 
and vice versa. This implies that a large volume of packets can be 
legitimate, as long as the rate at which the packets are sent remains 
constant. 
The second safe signal (SS-2) is based on the observation that 
during SYN scans the average network packet size drops to a size of 
40 bytes. Observations under normal conditions show that the av- 
erage packet size is within a range of 70 and 90 bytes. A step func- 
tion is implemented to derive this signal, with raw values between 
40 and 45 bytes given a SS-2 value of 0, 46-50 bytes a value of 10, 
51-60 bytes a value of 50, and over 61 bytes a value of 100. Pre- 
liminary experiments showed that a moving average is needed to 
increase the sensitivity of this signal. This average is created over 
a 60 second period. 
The inflammatory signal is binary and is based on remote root 
log-ins. If a remote root log-in is detected this signal equals one, 
acting as a multiplier for the other signals. 
 
3.2 Antigen 
The signals have been selected for the detection of SYN scans, 
based on observed changes in machine behaviour during a scan. 
Hence, the signals chosen in this paper differ from those in our 
previous research.  However, the antigen used for ping scan de- 
tection is also suitable for the detection of SYN scans.  Process 
identification numbers (PIDs) generated each time a system call is 
made form the antigen. All remote sessions facilitated by ssh are 
monitored for this experiment.  Using multiple system calls with 
identical PIDs allows for the aggregate antigen sampling method, 
described in Section 2.  This allows for the detection of exactly 
which process was active when changes in signal values are ob- 
served.  This technique is a form of process anomaly detection, 
but the actual structure of the PID is not important in terms of its 
classification, i.e. no pattern matching is performed, PIDs simply 
represent labels to identify processes. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTS 
The aim of this experiment is to apply the DCA to the detection 
of a SYN scan, launched from the machine which the algorithm is 
monitoring. Two datasets are used for this purpose: passive normal 
and active normal.  The passive normal dataset emulates a ‘night 
time’ scan, while the machine is not being actively used. It should 
be relatively easy to detect anomalous behaviour in this data set. 
The active normal dataset includes simultaneous web-traffic and 
scanning processes. 
The active normal dataset is 7000 seconds in duration, with ‘nor- 
mal’ antigen generated by running Firefox over a remote SSH ses- 
sion. During browsing, multiple downloads, chat sessions and the 
receipt of e-mail occurred representing different patterns of net- 
work behaviour. The passive normal dataset comprises of a nmap 
scan and its pts-ssh demon parent. Both datasets contain processes 
which were invoked as a result of running a remote SSH session 
to run the scan, logged in using a root password.  Both datasets 
contain a SYN scan of all ports using 254 IP addresses. Approx- 
imately 70 hosts were available at any time during the scan. As the 
scanned machines are part of a university network and the availab- 
ility of the machines is beyond our control. The scan performed in 
both datasets is a stealth SYN scan, with a fast probe sending rate 
( <0.1 sec per probe), facilitated through the use of the popular 
scanning tool, nmap[12]. The command used is “nmap   -sS -v 
xxx.xxx.xxx.1-254. Once these initial datasets are created, a 
‘replay client’ is used to process the same data repeatedly for dif- 
ferent experiments, even though the system is designed to and does 
work in real-time. 
Previous experience using the DCA has shown that there is little 
deviation in the output of the algorithm run on the same dataset, 
rendering repeats of identical experiments unnecessary. This is due 
to the sheer volume of input antigen sampled and the stochastic 
nature of the sampling process. System parameters for these exper- 
iments are as follows : number of signal categories = 4; number of 
signals per category = 2; tissue antigen storage = 500; number of 
cells = 100; number of antigen taken by DC in 1 update = 10; num- 
ber of antigen stored by a DC = 50; and the number of DC output 
signals = 3.  The MCAV coefficient is calculated for every 10000 
antigen presented, a number derived during preliminary investiga- 
tions. In terms of assessment, the PIDs with the highest volume of 
antigen output are used as the processes of interest. For the passive 
normal dataset these processes are the nmap scan process and the 
ssh demon. The processes of interest for the active normal dataset 
include the nmap scan, pts process and the Firefox browser and its 
children. Graphs are generated showing the MCAV for each pro- 
cess of interest per 10000 antigens presented, for the duration of 
the experiments. We expect higher values of MCAV for the nmap 
process and its parent process, the ssh demon, than for the Firefox 
browser or the bash shell. 
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All experiments are performed on an AMD Athlon 1GHz Debian 
linux machine (kernel 2.4.10). The algorithm is implemented within 
the libtissue framework[15], implemented in C (gcc 4.0.2) 
with interprocess communication facilitated by the SCTP protocol. 
All signals are derived using signal collection scripts, with values 
taken from the ‘proc’ filesystem (PAMP-1, DS-1, SS-1, I), the tcp- 
stat linux utility (D2, SS-2) and a custom developed packet sniffer 
(PAMP-2). 
4.1 Results 
Figures 4 and 5 show the input signals for the active normal 
(AN) and passive normal (PN) datasets respectively.   In reality, 
both sets of signals are extremely noisy, and the figures depicted 
are smoothed representations of the actual signal values used in the 
experiments.  Inflammation is a binary signal an is not represen- 
ted on these figures.  The AN signals are more variable than the 
PN signals, as many more processes run during the AN session. 
In the AN session, the duration of the nmap scan is approximately 
6000 seconds, with the scan initiating at 651s.  Signals PAMP-1, 
PAMP-2 and DS-2 clearly change for the duration of the scan. The 
remaining signals are less clear, though some evidence of changes 
throughout the scan duration is shown. The changes are transient 
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and localised in particular to the beginning of the scan, when the 
majority of probes are sent to other hosts. 
The signals of the PN dataset are less noisy.  Analysis of in- 
put antigen confirms nearly 99% of these antigens belong to the 
anomalous pts and nmap processes. PAMP-1 and PAMP-2 are re- 
sponsive to the scan, as shown by their rapid decline towards the 
end of the scanning period, at 5500s.  Changes in DS1 are more 
pronounced in the PN dataset, yet the magnitude of this signal is 
smaller than expected. DS-2 appears to be highly correlated with 
the scan, yielding values of over 20 throughout the scan duration. 
SS-1 performs poorly, and only decreases in response to the scan 
in a few select places. SS-2 falls sharply in the middle of the scan, 
as predicted, but otherwise remains at a constant level of 60 even 
after the scan has finished. 
Figure 5: Simplified sketch of the input signals comprising the 
passive normal  dataset.  Inflammation is not represented. 
 
 
every 10000 antigens. In Figures 6 and 7 each point represents the 
MCAV over 10000 antigens per process, for each process of in- 
terest.  Figure 6 shows the MCAV output for PN. High values of 
over 0.5 are shown consistently for both nmap and pts in this ex- 
periment. This is evident for the first 40000 antigens. The MCAV 
values for the remainder of the scan are low, as at this point the scan 
slows to such extent that the behaviour of the machine remains con- 
stant, causing little change in signals and resulting in low MCAV 
values. 
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Figure 6: MCAV per 1000 antigens for the passive normal data- 
set. Nmap and Pts processes detected and represented. 
 
 
Figure 4: Simplified sketch of the input signals comprising the 
active normal  dataset.  Inflammation is not represented. 
 
The antigen log file for the output of the DCA in both experi- 
ments (AN and PN) is partitioned and MCAVs recalculated after 
Figure 7 presents the results of the active normal datasets. High 
MCAVs for the nmap and pts processes are evident throughout the 
scan duration, indicating successful detection. However, a number 
of firefox antigens also have high values of MCAV, reaching the 
maximum value of 1 as the scan is performed. Similarly, the nmap 
and firefox mean MCAV across the entire session is 0.16 for both 
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processes, with identical standard deviations of 0.31. It appears that 
it is not possible to separate the two active processes if normal and 
attack processes run concurrently. 
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Figure 7: MCAV per 1000 antigens for the active normal  data- 
set. Nmap, Pts and parent Firefox browser  processes detected 
and represented. 
 
 
 
5. ANALYSIS 
The results presented in Figure 6 show that the DCA can be used 
to detect large scale port-scans over an extended duration. It is im- 
portant to note that the input data is both noisy and voluminous. 
The number of input antigen for both datasets is in excess of 1.3 
million in total with the the actual input signal data also very noisy, 
with events such as network availability highly variable.  Under 
‘night time’ conditions, which are ideal, the algorithm performs re- 
markably well, compressing 1.3 million data items to a resultant 
130,000 antigens (for PN), over the 7000s duration. The perform- 
ance in terms of detection is also exemplary, indicating that the 
DCA is successful when applied to a ‘real-world’ scenario. 
A number of false positives are shown through high MCAVs for 
the firefox process in the AN session, as shown in Figure 7. This in- 
dicates that the DCA has difficulty in separating concurrent normal 
and anomalous processes, when the analysis is based on the value 
of the MCAVs alone. However, the MCAV can be combined with 
the antigen confidence indicator. For example, in the AN experi- 
ment a total of 130,000 antigens are presented for analysis. Some 
67000 of those antigens belong to the nmap process over the entire 
session, and can account for nearly 90% of the antigens produced 
when the nmap scan is highly active.  In contrast, during periods 
of high nmap activity, the relative proportion of antigen presented 
belonging to the firefox process is under 10%.  A combination of 
MCAV and antigen confidence indicatior can show not only how 
anomalous a process is deemed to be, but the level of confidence in 
the assessment. The greater the antigen input, the more times the 
antigen is sampled and the more accurate the MCAV. Charts repres- 
enting the relative proportions of antigen input and antigen output 
are shown in Figures 8 and 9 respectively. Combining the relative 
proportion of antigen output per process with the MCAVs may lead 
to fewer false positives and effective anomaly detection. 
Additionally, reduction of false positives may be achieved through 
exploring the facets of the number of antigens used to derive the 
MCAVs per process.  In these experiments 10000 antigens were 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Proportionate chart of antigen per processes as input 
data for the active normal  dataset 
 
 
used for the calculation, but could be based on time or some other 
metric of system activity. As explored previously [4] the sampling 
DCs are sensitive to the length of time spent receiving signals in the 
tissue compartment. Longer sampling windows during low activity 
and shorter windows during high activity may make the detection 
more fine grained. Moving averages applied to the MCAV values 
over time may also alleviate this problem. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
The DCA is a new development in AIS, and as yet has not been 
extensively tested. This paper presents work towards understand- 
ing the behaviour of the algorithm when applied to larger realistic 
problems.  Its unique methods of combining multiple signals and 
correlating the combined values with a separate antigen data-stream 
works well for the detection of SYN scans over a long duration. 
However, some impairments in performance were shown when at- 
tempting to classify a scanning process when run concurrently with 
other active user-driven processes. Due to the nature of the input 
data and the methods of correlation employed, it is difficult to com- 
pare the algorithm with other standard methods, though in future 
network packet analysis may be performed for the sake of com- 
parison.  Additionally, individual signals alone are insufficient to 
produce successful classification based on both the volume of data 
and the amount of noise present in the input signals. 
In addendum to the investigations proposed in Section 5, a num- 
ber of future directions exist for the DCA. The first and most obvi- 
ous future direction is a definitive benchmark test, to compare the 
performance of the DCA to other AIS and anomaly detection ap- 
proaches. The introduction of adaptive signals or variable weights, 
for example using different weights at different times of the day, is 
another avenue to explore with the DCA. The algorithm may also 
be applied to other scan detection problems and to other problems 
in computer security. In addition applications outside of the scope 
of computer security can be considered such as the analysis of ra- 
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dendritic cells as a novel immune-inspired algorithm for 
anomaly detection. In ICARIS-05, LNCS 3627, pages 
153–167, 2005. 
[5] J. Greensmith, U. Aickelin, and J. Twycross. Articulation 
and clarification of the dendritic cell algorithm. In 
ICARIS-06, LNCS 4163, pages 404–417, 2006. 
[6] J. Greensmith, J. Twycross, and U. Aickelin. Dendritic cells 
for anomaly detection. In IEEE Congress on Evolutionary 
Computation(CEC 2006), pages 664–671, 2006. 
[7] S Hofmeyr. An immunological model of distributed detection 
and its application to computer security. PhD thesis, 
University Of New Mexico, 1999. 
[8] J Kim and P J Bentley. Towards an artificial immune system 
for network intrusion detection: An investigation of clonal 
selection with a negative selection operator. In Proceeding of 
the Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC-2001), 
Seoul, Korea, pages 1244–1252, 2001. 
[9] M.B. Lutz and G. Schuler. Immature, semi-mature and fully 
mature dendritic cells: which signals induce tolerance or 
immunity? Trends in Immunology, 23(9):991–1045, 2002. 
[10] P. Matzinger. Tolerance, danger and the extended family. 
Annual Reviews in Immunology, 12:991–1045, 1994. 
[11] T.R. Mosmann and A.M. Livingstone. Dendritic cells: the 
Figure 9: Proportionate chart  of antigen per processes as out- 
put data for the active normal  dataset 
 
 
dio data from space, or to mobile robotics. The results presented 
in this paper have shown that the DCA is capable of performing 
scan detection under difficult conditions through a unique form of 
immune inspired data fusion. 
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